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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5287
This paper proposes that, to increase the efficiency of 
public spending in oil-rich economies, some or all of 
the oil revenues be transferred to citizens, and fiscal 
instruments such as taxation be used to finance public 
expenditures. The authors develop the case as follows. 
First, they confirm the well-known result that public-
expenditure efficiency is lower in oil-rich countries 
compared with other developing countries. Second, 
they show that this efficiency gap is associated with 
differences in accountability to citizens of government’s 
spending decisions. They find that various measures 
of accountability are systematically weaker in oil-rich 
countries. They attribute this difference to the fact that 
oil revenues typically accrue directly to the government, 
This paper—a product of the Chief Economist office, Africa Region—is part of a larger effort in the department to study 
oil revenues redistribution in Sub-Saharan Africa. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://
econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at graballand@worldbank.org.  
unlike tax revenues, which pass through the hands of 
citizens. Third, they show that, controlling for a number 
of factors, accountability is stronger in countries that 
rely more on direct taxation to finance public spending. 
They conclude that accountability, and hence public 
expenditure efficiency, can be increased by transferring 
oil revenues to citizens and then taxing them to finance 
public spending. The paper reviews existing schemes that 
redistribute oil revenues to the population, such as the 
Alaska Citizen Fund, to assess the feasibility of a modest 
proposal in African countries. The authors conclude that, 
while it may be difficult to implement such a proposal in 
existing oil producers, there is scope for introducing it in 
some of Africa’s new oil producers. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The literature on oil-rich economies has centered on demonstrating the (usually 
negative) impact of oil resources on macroeconomic stability, governance and growth.  
It is a fact that a great majority of oil-rich developing countries fail to diversify their 
economies.  Oil booms’ pressures on wasteful spending and corruption --the driving 
force behind such inefficient expenditures--is well documented and led to the concept 
of a “natural resource curse” (see, for example, Sachs and Warner (1995, 2001), 
Gylfason et al. (1999), Leite and Weidmann (1999), Auty (2001), Moore (2007)), 
although according to Lederman and Maloney (2007), the resource curse is not a 
“destiny”.   
Because of the negative impact of oil resources on governance, the main policy 
recommendations for oil-rich economies have been threefold: (i) save oil revenues for 
future generations and mitigate the detrimental impact of volatility of oil revenue 
flows by appropriate fiscal stabilization mechanisms; (ii) increase transparency and 
efficiency of oil revenue collection and spending; and (iii) redistribute oil revenues to 
citizens to limit embezzlements of public funds (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 
2003, Birdsall and Subramanian, 2004, Sandbu, 2006). Dewatripont et al. (2006) even 
describe a model in which politicians fund projects that are wasteful as a way to signal 
their diligence to their constituencies. 
Despite the need for better public spending efficiency, results continue to be 
disappointing in several oil-rich economies
2 and there are a growing number of studies 
demonstrating at the household level that citizens do not benefit from revenues 
derived from oil rents (Najman et al. 2007). 
The literature on the impact of an oil boom neglects another literature, which 
makes the link between taxation and accountability of public spending. Taxation sets 
                                                 
2 That is also why Collier (2006) had also asked if aid could not be compared to oil in terms of its effect 
on development. He concluded that it was not the case although he acknowledged the minimal impact 
of some aid projects on economic and social development.   3
up the interaction between citizens and the state, with the former holding the latter 
accountable. Brautigam (2008) stresses that ‘state-building is shaped by societies, and 
taxation is a strategic nexus between the state and society’ (p.25).  The state can 
broaden the base and enforce the collection of tax revenues.  As citizens pay higher 
taxes, they demand better service, which requires better public expenditures.  The 
relationship usually referred to as a fiscal contract is a two-way relationship because 
broad-based taxation raises citizens’ expectation about enhanced efficiency of public 
expenditures and the democratic process. What Karl (2007) calls the participation 
deficit, “a lack of connection between subjects and the state, which breaks any sense 
of ownership of public resources or consequent citizen engagement” seems to be one 
of the most important challenges for oil economies. The linkage has even been 
highlighted as central to avoiding the natural resource curse in natural resource rich 
countries (OECD, 2008, McGuirk, 2010). Governments in oil-rich countries gather 
less revenue from domestic taxation (Henry and Springborg, 2001) and are therefore 
not held accountable (Bornhorst et al. 2008, Moore 2007).  Capacity in tax 
administration is also more problematic (Knack 2008) and there emerge needs for 
states to enhance tax policy efficiency and administration (Levi, 1988; Bates and Lien, 
1985). As governments do not rely on revenues raised from taxing their citizens, they 
are not held accountable (Bird et al. 2008).  
However, in policy recommendations for oil-rich economies, the fiscal contract 
is absent in the sense that the taxation of citizens is not considered, especially in 
developing  countries, due to the fact that (i) the tax base is limited; (ii) tax 
administration capacity and governance are weak; and (iii) states do not need revenues 
from individual taxes.  
There is therefore a vicious circle, which is difficult to break:  less taxation of 
citizens implies less accountability and public scrutiny of public spending and low 
efficiency and poor service delivery, which further limits possibilities to tax citizens 
(see McGuirk for a study of this cycle).  The purpose of this paper is to try and break 
that vicious circle by making the case for having some or all of oil revenues   4
transferred directly to citizens, and then having the state tax citizens to finance public 
spending. 
We build the case in three steps.  In section 2, we show that high levels of oil 
revenues are associated with low levels of transparency in public budgets and 
efficiency in public spending.  In section 3, we demonstrate empirically that without 
taxation of citizens, accountability of public spending is necessarily limited and 
without government accountability vis-à-vis citizens, public spending efficiency is 
likely to remain low. We conclude that transferring oil revenues to citizens and taxing 
them is one way of improving public spending efficiency.  To see how this proposal 
could be implemented, in section 4, we present various schemes to redistribute oil 
revenues to citizens.  In section 5, we present some concluding remarks and areas for 
future research. 
2.  The relationship among oil, accountability and poor outcomes of public 
spending 
 
Low levels of budget transparency in oil-dependent countries are common and 
may lead to poor management of resource wealth over the medium to long term.     
Countries such as Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Equatorial Guinea 
score 0 out of 100 on the Open Budget Index 2008 (Heuty et al. 2009)
3.   
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that public spending per capita in oil-
rich countries is much higher than in non-oil economies (see Figures 1 and 2). Not 
only are oil exports associated with higher public spending levels but the association is 
even higher in the case of large oil reserves (over 20 billion barrels). Large reserves 
                                                 
3 One of the main drivers of conflict in Sudan has been the historical concentration of wealth and power 
in the central government in the North, at the expense of the poor majority in the rest of the country. 
Since 2003, the country has been undergoing an oil and gas boom, accounting for an estimated $2 
billion in annual revenues, or nearly 70 percent of the country’s exports. Despite the fact that the 2005 
peace accord in Sudan mandated disclosure of the amount of oil revenues, neither the government in 
Khartoum nor that in Southern Sudan have provided reliable information, leading to suspicion that the 
money has been used for non-civilian purposes, which threatens the stability of the agreement (Heuty et 
al. 2009). 
   5
induce confidence over the economic future of the country and, based on of the 
rationale of export diversification, public spending is increased. 
Figure 1:  Public spending per capita and oil exports 
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Furthermore, oil economies subsidize oil products and fuels, leading to poor 
energy efficiency and greater waste of resources (see Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3:  Energy efficiency and oil exports 
 
 
Finally, despite several public expenditure reviews (PERs) (usually funded by 
donors), oil-dependent countries appear to remain with weaker expenditure control 
systems (one extreme being Nigeria). Table 1 gives the average scores on three 
dimensions of expenditure accountability for oil producers, mineral producers and 
non-resource-dependent economies.  It is clear that oil producing countries have 
greater difficulty managing revenue windfalls
4.  These countries face greater obstacles 
in designing long-term plans and linking them to medium-term expenditure 
frameworks and annual budgets. Moreover, the fact that revenues derived from oil 
production and exports are often kept out of the regular budgets of oil-rich countries 
                                                 
4 These countries, for instance, score 25 out of 100 on revenue volatility and forecasting—significantly 
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can further undermine public oversight over how resource windfalls are spent (Heuty 
and al. 2009)
5. 
Table 1:  Performance of countries by category on budget accountability 
 







Expenditure controls  22  52  48 
Link policy/ planning/budget  17  37  35 
Extra budgetary operations  20  31  32 
 
Source: Heuty et al. (2009). Note: Categories are defined as average of questions of the Open Budget 
Index. For more information on the Survey, and the methodology used to calculate the OBI, see 
www.openbudgetindex.org. 100 represents a fully open budget. 
 
Low efficiency of PERs in these countries could also probably explained by 
the fact that these states usually do not need much external funding (except during a 
period of fall of international oil prices) and therefore, external pressure from donors 
is, in most cases, does not bring much results (despite decades of engagement). 
 
3.  The link between taxation, accountability and poor outcome of public 
spending: A cross-country analysis 
 
Having confirmed that oil producing countries have generally weaker 
expenditure efficiency and accountability, we now investigate how taxation may help 
strengthen them.  We proceed in two steps.  First, we show how accountability has an 
effect on the outcomes of public spending.  Then we show how taxation can have a 
discernible effect on accountability in oil-dependent economies. 
From the literature, we know that there is an inverse relationship between oil 
dependence and the level of spending in education, all other things being equal, 
                                                 
5 However, the OBI 2008 results also show that countries can be transparent and accountable to the 
public despite substantial natural resource endowments. For example, South Africa, Norway, Botswana, 
and Peru all show strong performance on the OBI relative to other hydrocarbon and mineral producers 
(Heuty et al. 2009).    8
mainly due to overconfidence in the future and less of a need to invest in human 
capital (Gylfason, 2001). Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) demonstrate that efficiency 
of public spending in education is affected by the quality of governance (measured 
mainly by quality of bureaucracy and the level of corruption). 
  In our first step, we test if accountability vis-à-vis citizens can affect the 
quality of public spending in education. Using the Rajkumar-Swaroop specification, 
we introduce a measure of voice and accountability
6 extracted from Kaufman et al. 
governance indicators
7.  
  Table 2 gives the results of this first step
8. As expected, voice and 
accountability have indeed a strong association with the education outcome 
(secondary enrolment) even after controlling for spending level, GDP per capita and 
level of urbanization. The greater is the possibility for citizens to raise their voice, the 
better is the outcome of public spending.  It is worth noting that even though control of 
corruption is with the expected sign, it is not significant, which may be explained by 
the fact that control of corruption and voice and accountability are correlated.  
                                                 
6 Voice and accountability measures the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media 
(estimate). Source: Kaufman governance indicators. 
7 For definition and sources of variables, see annex 1. We used the voice and accountability measure 
and not the others because of the strong correlation between the four measures. 
8 Series are not highly correlated with the exception of gdp and living in urban areas.   9
 
Table 2: The Relationship between Outcome of Public Spending and 
Accountability 
 
             
Dependent variable: Gross secondary enrollment ratio 
   (1)    (2)   
Urban population  0.25 ** 0.25 **
0.09     0.09    
GDP per capita  14.59 ** 14.58 **
2.02     2.04    
Pupil/teacher ratio, secondary  -0.44 ** -0.43 **
0.20     0.20    
Public secondary education spending  0.39 ** 0.37 **
0.14     0.14    
Voice and accountability  3.87 ** 2.73 * 
1.26     1.52    
Control of corruption       1.61   
      1.79    
Sub-Saharan Africa  -25.62 ** -23.99 **
7.08     7.43    
South Asia  -32.04 ** -31.42 **
10.43     10.12    
Middle East and North Africa  -27.03 ** -26.77 **
7.15     7.12    
East Asia and Pacific  -21.88 ** -20.39 **
6.53     6.85    
Europe and Central Asia  -29.80 ** -28.83 **
6.90     7.13    
Latin America and the Caribbean  -33.49 ** -31.84 **
6.92     7.25    
Constant  -45.13    -46.11 **
17.71     17.88    
# of obs.  185   185   
R^2  0.77   0.77   
(standard deviation shown in italic) 
 
The second step consists of examining if taxation can improve the 
accountability of government when oil-dependency lowers it.   10
  Various recent micro empirical studies emphasize the need to broaden the tax 
base to citizens in order to create an interaction between citizens and governments and 
thereby increase spending efficiency.  Table 3 summarizes the results of past studies 
and experiments.  
 





Source: OECD 2008 adapted from Moore (2007). 
 
In addition to the overall level of taxation, the shift from trade taxes to more 
visible taxes of individuals appears to enhance accountability of the government. For 
example, although a VAT is an indirect tax, it has a certain degree of visibility.  It is a 
tax on general consumption and hence relatively broad-based.  Therefore it can 
effectively mobilize taxpayers while relieving the burden of bookkeeping on small 
businesses through commonly used threshold exemptions. VAT has been highly   11
visible in Ghana and Uganda, where its introduction was contentious, and where 
recurrent political debate about VAT rates suggests that its political effect has been 
quite direct (OECD 2008).  
  Therefore, in our second step, we test if the share of various taxes has an 
impact on accountability vis-à-vis citizens. The greater is the share of taxes on trade 
(the least visible type of tax, and a narrower tax base), the less accountable the 
government is likely to be. Moreover, due to the fact that in oil economies, revenue 
from taxes are minimal, we can expect that controlling for the impact of various taxes, 
a greater dependency on oil is likely to create less accountability.   
For this second step, we depart from Shah’s (2005) specification by controlling 
for a country’s level of development (GDP per capita) and overall policy framework 
(trade openness ratio).  We test whether variables capturing the dependence on various 
types of taxes as well as oil dependency are significantly associated with 
accountability. In this second step, we keep the same measure of voice and 
accountability.  
  Table 4 gives the results of this second step. We use two measures of oil 
dependency.  In specification 1, we use the share of oil exports in total exports and in 
the second one, we use the share oil exports in GDP from the World Development 
Indicators database.  In both cases, controlling for development and policy variables, it 
appears that oil dependency has a negative association with accountability
9. This 
confirms what is alluded to in the literature on the resource curse.  
But what is striking is that, for countries relying on income taxes of individuals 
(measured as a share of total taxes), accountability is much higher (controlling for the 
same variables). By contrast, for countries relying on trade taxes, which can be 
associated with rents in some countries, accountability is lower (although the 
coefficient is not strongly significant). It is also worth noting that controlling for all 
                                                 
9 This is also consistent with findings from Heuty et al. (2009).   12
these variables, Africa seems to suffer from a certain lack of accountability. That is 
also precisely why a fiscal contract needs to be established in African countries.  
 
Table 4:  The Main Determinants of Accountability 
 
Dependent variable: Voice and accountability 
  
   (1)     (2)    
GDP per capita 
0.01    -0.01   
0.05    0.03   
Openness  0.10    0.36 ** 
0.15    0.12   
Trade tax 
-0.26    -0.22   
0.65    0.40   
Individual tax  3.45 **  3.33 ** 
0.76    0.43   
Oil exports  -0.65 *      
0.37        
Fuel exports        -1.07 * 
      0.62   
Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.42    -0.58 ** 
0.41    0.21   
South Asia  -0.50    -0.26   
0.46    0.22   
Middle East and North 
Africa 
0.11    -0.04   
0.40    0.21   
East Asia and Pacific  -0.76 *  -0.68 ** 
0.41    0.20   
Europe and Central Asia  0.40    0.23   
0.36    0.16   
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
0.48    0.36   
0.45    0.22   
Constant 
-0.26    -0.32   
0.69    0.40   
# of obs.   78    203   
R^2  0.657    0.611   
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  Therefore, a vicious circle operates in most oil-rich economies: citizens are 
slightly taxed, therefore scrutiny of public spending and government accountability is 
low, which induces poor service delivery and maintain poverty at high levels, which 
now prevents taxation of citizens (see Figure 4). 
 




In this environment, it is relatively easy to conclude that public efficiency is 
likely to remain low in oil-rich economies. How can such a fiscal contract be achieved 
in poverty-ridden countries, where tax evasion is so high? How to break the vicious 
circle? One needs to start by increasing the taxation of individuals. However, in some 
oil-rich countries, taxation can only happen after having redistributed part of the rent. 












4.  Oil redistribution schemes: A way of increasing citizens’ scrutiny on 
public spending? 
 
While there have been many oil redistribution schemes proposed, they have 
not been combined with a fiscal contract. At best, policy makers and researchers 
advocate for redistributing directly revenues from oil extraction to citizens (proposals 
from Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) for Nigeria and Birdsall and 
Subramanian. (2004) for Iraq), and letting them spend or save it.  This is probably 
related to the fact that in developing countries, tax evasion is likely to be high 
(Newbery et al. 1987, Bird et al. 2008) and direct taxation is relatively small (OECD 
2008). Therefore, higher direct taxation must be put in place after a higher 
redistribution share. But the main strength of oil economies lies in the fact that they 
benefit from sufficient revenues that they can share a part to citizens. 
In the real world, the Alaska Permanent Fund is one of the few examples of oil 
redistribution schemes (Anderson 2002). Despite strong government effectiveness and 
good governance, the current redistribution scheme is increasingly coming under 
criticism. It appears as if there is a growing apathy from the population on public 
spending scrutiny and gradually, investment in public goods is neglected. Some voices 
in Alaska are calling for the introduction of new taxes on individuals in order to create 
a fiscal contract. Some observers of the situation in Alaska seem to believe that 
without a taxation relationship, the efficiency of public spending deteriorates 
overtime.  
In order to explicitly take account of this relationship, we present some 
characteristics of another option, which could be called: “citizen funds+”: a share of 
oil revenues would be redistributed annually to any eligible citizen of the   15
state/country, and from this amount, one part would be taxed to increase public 
scrutiny and broaden the tax base
10.  
We present in Table 5 a comparison among the standard approach (increase 
public scrutiny by donors and international NGOs), the Alaska model, and our 
proposal of a “Citizen Fund+”
11. 
 
Table 5: Weaknesses and Shortcomings of Various Schemes 
of Oil Redistribution Revenues 
 
There are obviously some difficulties in implementing such schemes. 
Challenges derive from mainly two types of problems: governance and 
logistics/technical problems. 
On the governance side, what is the required level of political will and 
stability? Lederman et al. (2005) demonstrated empirically that political will and 
stability have a major impact on corruption and accountability. If a government does 
not want to implement such redistribution scheme, external pressure is likely to fail, 
                                                 
10 A major share of oil rents would be saved and for the spending share (based for instance on 
permanent income hypothesis), one part would be allocated to citizens with a small share taxed. 
11 It is worth noting that the citizens fund ++ model is not exclusive from the current model based on 
pressure for increased transparency mainly from external pressure. 
  Redistribution through 
public 
spending/external 




Citizen Fund  + 
Vested interest for scrutiny 
of public spending 
Low  High but declining  High 
Investment in public goods  Low  to  medium 
(infrastructure) 
Low to medium 
(infrastructure) 
Medium?? 
Level of domestic taxation  Low  Very low  Low to medium 
Political  Feasibility  Relatively easy (if 
subsidies to population) 
Relatively easy  Relatively  difficult 
with governments 
Technical Feasibility  Relatively easy  Relatively difficult  Difficult   16
and this mechanism cannot be seriously implemented. Moreover, any government 
could strive to siphon some of the redistributed funds. This in line with the critics such 
as Hjort (2006), who explains that in a low-capacity and corruption-ridden country, 
there will be even more leakages in the system and corruption. Focusing on Argentina 
and using a new sub-national democracy index, Gervasoni (2007) demonstrates that 
intergovernmental revenue-sharing rules that disproportionately favor the less 
populated (and more overrepresented) districts provide their incumbents with generous 
“fiscal federalism rents” that allow them to restrict democratic contestation and 
weaken checks and balances
12.  
It is possible that increasing redistribution schemes, most probably through 
sub-national institutions, would reduce accountability, but that is where the taxation 
element can play a role—to curb the apathy tendency of citizens when oil revenues are 
distributed.  Moreover, Shah (2005) has demonstrated that accountability may be 
higher when fiscal decentralization is increased. 
The feasibility and complexity of such schemes need to be addressed.  But 
aside from Norway, no large oil-rich economy has been successful in achieving 
efficient public spending, despite external pressure for more transparency. 
On the logistical/technical side, it is obvious that many questions need to be 
answered
13 such as the existing capacity of revenue administration and the tax culture 
in a country or which taxing instruments (e.g., direct personal income tax, property 
taxes or some types of indirect taxes, such as the VAT, and user fees) need to be 
selected
14? Should redistributed resources be taxed directly or indirectly or should 
there be a user fee for public goods?  Who should be eligible for these schemes? 
Would there be any discriminatory criteria? And finally, on the logistical side, what is 
                                                 
12 Ross (2007) also explains that this would not address regional grievances, since those who live closer 
to the mineral’s source would continue to ask for a larger share of revenues, which can not be satisfied. 
13 We leave aside the question of what should be the share to redistribute since it is essentially an issue 
of consensus to reach between elites and informed citizens. 
14 From a political economy perspective, three elements need to be satisfied: ensuring transparency; 
building in functional mechanisms to overcome institutional constraints; and building consensus around 
oil revenue management.   17
the required capacity threshold for local tax administration
15? How is it possible to 
reach citizens in remote regions?  
5.  Concluding remarks and areas for future research  
 
This paper demonstrates that without shaping a fiscal social contract through 
taxation of citizens in oil-rich economies, the outcome of public spending will 
probably remain low despite increased external pressure for transparency. The line of 
argument is straightforward:  citizens are more likely to hold their governments 
accountable when they have to pay more taxes; and as a result, the governments have 
incentives to design and implement policies that improve the welfare of the 
population. (See, for example, More 2004.)  However, in a poverty-ridden country, 
without prior redistribution of a small share to citizens, taxation is likely to remain 
impossible. 
Some pilot initiatives should probably be undertaken first before expanding 
them to more countries or regions. Despite its complexity, this experiment should 
probably be launched because after decades of external pressure, it is probably time to 
acknowledge that donors’ pressure in these countries is not as efficient as expected. 
Most citizens in oil-rich economies do not have any link with their government. Even 
though not perfect (especially at the beginning), this experiment should create a link 
between citizens in some SSA countries and their government. 
This proposal is not easy to implement but, in the field of oil-rich economies, 
there is not any initiative, such as EITI (Extractive Industries and Transparency 
Initiative) or the National Resource Charter
16, which is easy to implement and they all 
depend on elites’ willingness to adhere to the process.  
However, one of the most important advantages of this proposal (overt the 
other initiatives) would be to be aligned with some politicians’ incentives. Indeed, this 
                                                 
15 This is a concern raised by Ross (2007) regarding citizens funds. He points out that these schemes are 
complex to administer. 
16 http://www.naturalresourcecharter.org/.   18
proposal could, in the short term, benefit a politician since citizens will have their 
incomes raised by the redistribution part (and could then be grateful to them for this 
influx of incomes).  
In order to address the pertinent questions related to this proposal, country case 
studies could be undertaken to test the feasibility of redistributive and tax mechanisms 
as presented. The recent discovery of oil reserves in some African countries opens up 
new opportunities as well as challenges for public engagement, public discussion and 
donor support to intervention in institutional arrangements for the entire value chain, 
including resource collection and management. 
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  Urban population. Urban population is the midyear population of areas 
defined as urban in each country and reported to the United Nations. United 
Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. Source: World Bank WDI. 
  GDP per capita. GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). 
PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using 
purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing 
power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP at 
purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in 
the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in 
the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural 
resources. Data are in constant 2005 international dollars. World Bank, 
International Comparison Program database.  Variable in logarithms. Source: 
World Bank WDI. 
  Openness. Imports of goods and services (BoP, current US$) plus exports of 
goods and services (BoP, current US$) as a share of GDPGDP (current US$). 
Source: World Bank. WDI. 
 
Education variables: 
  Gross secondary education enrollment ratio. School enrollment, secondary 
(% gross). Break in series between 1997 and 1998 due to due to change from 
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED76) to ISCED97. 
Recent data are provisional. Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total 
enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially 
corresponds to the level of education shown. Source: World Bank WDI. 
  Public secondary education spending. Share of public expenditure for 
secondary education is the percentage of public education expenditure for 
secondary education. Public expenditure (current and capital) includes 
government spending on educational institutions (both public and private), 
education administration as well as subsidies for private entities 
(students/households and other private’s entities). United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics. 
Source: World Bank WDI. 
  Secondary pupil teacher ratio. Break in series between 1997 and 1998 due to 
due to change from International Standard Classification of Education   23
(ISCED76) to ISCED97. Recent data are provisional. Secondary school pupil-
teacher ratio is the number of pupils enrolled in secondary school divided by 
the number of secondary school teachers (regardless of their teaching 
assignment). United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) Institute for Statistics. Source: World Bank WDI.  
 
Governance indicators: 
  Government effectiveness. Measures the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to such policies (estimate). 
Source: Kaufman governance indicators. 
  Control of corruption. Measures the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests In brief our 
methodology (estimate). Source: Kaufman governance indicators. 
  Voice and accountability. Measures the extent to which a country's citizens 
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media (estimate). Source: 
Kaufman governance indicators. 





  General Government final Consumption Expenditure per Capita. General 
Government final Consumption Expenditure per Capita (current US$) (average 
2002-2006). Source: World Bank. WDI. 
 
Taxes: 
  Trade tax. Import tax, export tax plus other trade duties (as a share of total tax 
revenue). Source: IMF IFS. 
  Individual tax. (as a share of total tax revenue). Source: IMF IFS. 
 
Oil export measures and reserves: 
  Crude oil exports. Crude oil exports (number of thousand barrels per day) 
(2005). Source: Energy Information Administration, International Energy 
Annual 2006, table posted December 8, 2008. 
  Oil exports. Exports (mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc.) as a share 





  Fuel export. Fuel exports (as a percentage of merchandise exports) times 
merchandise exports (current US$) over GDP (current US$). Source: World 
Bank WDI. 
  Crude oil reserves. Crude oil proved reserves (number of billions of barrels) 
(2008). Source: Energy Information Administration, International Energy 
Annual 2006, table posted December 8, 2008. 
 
Energy Efficiency: 
  Energy Efficiency. GDP per unit of energy use (PPP$ per kilo of oil 
equivalent) (average 2002-2006). Source: World Bank. WDI. 
 
 
 